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Patricia Mindus, Uppsala / Sweden
* 
 
Updating Democracy Studies: Outline of a Research Program 
 
Abstract:  Technologies  carry  politics  since  they  embed  values.  It  is  therefore  surprising  that 
mainstream political and legal theory have taken the issue so lightly. Compared to what has been 
going  on  over  the  past  few  decades  in  the  other  branches  of  practical  thought,  namely  ethics, 
economics and the law, political theory lags behind. Yet the current emphasis on Internet politics that 
polarizes  the  apologists  holding  the  web  to  overcome  the  one-to-many  architecture  of  opinion-
building in traditional representative democracy, and the critics that warn cyber-optimism entails 
authoritarian technocracy has acted as a wake up call. This paper sets the problem – “What is it 
about  ICTs,  as  opposed  to  previous  technical  devices,  that  impact  on  politics  and  determine 
uncertainty about democratic matters?” – into the broad context of practical philosophy, by offering a 
conceptual map of clusters of micro-problems and concrete examples relating to “e-democracy”. The 
point is to highlight when and why the hyphen of e-democracy has a conjunctive or a disjunctive 
function, in respect to stocktaking from past experiences and settled democratic theories. My claim is 
that there is considerable scope to analyse how and why online politics fails or succeeds. The field 
needs both further empirical and theoretical work. 
Keywords: Democracy, Internet, Ethics, Technology, ICTs, Political Theory, Legal Theory 
 
I. The bleeding edge? 
In the December issue 2010 of Foreign Affairs the chair and CEO of Google, Eric Schmidt 
and  the  Director  of  Google  ideas,  Jared  Cohen,  declared  that  “the  advent  and  power  of 
connection technologies (…) will make the 21
st century all about surprises. Governments will 
be caught off-guard when large numbers of their citizens, armed with virtually nothing but 
cell phones, take part in mini-rebellions that challenge their authority”.
1 The democratization 
of communications, the theory goes, will bring about the democratization of the world. This 
vision, and the rhetoric it feeds on, seems to have been supported by plenty of evidence: 
digital militants appeared by the minute, including the Philippino “sms revolution” that forced 
President  Estrada  from  office  (2001),  flash-mobs  in  Ukraine  that  led  to  the  “Orange 
Revolution” (2004), monks in Burma armed with digital cameras joined the collaborative 
enterprise  of  exposing  repression  in  what  was  labelled  the  “Saffron  Revolution”,  the 
Columbian  anti-farc  demonstrations  organized  on  FB  by  the  unemployed  engineer  Oscar 
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Morales,  Lebanese  email-use  prompting  Syrian  troupe-withdrawal  or  “Cedar  Revolution” 
(2005), the Venezuelan student movement that kept Radio Caracas Television onto Youtube 
(2007), the Ushahidi “crisis-mapping” in the Kenyan 2008 postelection violence reporting, 
the Charter 08 in China that – notwithstanding the Great firewall and the 50 cent party
2 – 
garnered most of its signatures though blog sites such as  bullog.cn, the Twitter-conveyed 
crowds in Chisinau in 2009, the Uighur demonstrations that were being posted on microblogs 
in 2009 even after the Chinese authorities shut down the Internet connections in the Xinjiang-
region,  the  Iranian  presidential  election  protests  or  “Green  movement”  that  was  quickly 
redubbed the “Twitter revolution”.
3 And all this was before Mohamed Bouzazi’s sacrifice set 
the dégage-movement on the map, ultimately leading to the outing of Ben Ali as a starter for 
what currently goes under the appellative “Arab Spring”. In hindsight, it is ironic that Tunis 
hosted the World Summit of Information Society in November 2005 that instituted the new 
UN “forum for multi-stakeholder dialogue”, i.e. the Internet Governance Forum. 
Add to this, new practices such as sns-collected smart-mobs, sms-gathered participatory 
budgeting, circumvention methods protecting netizens’ anonymity such as the free software 
Tor, as well as the fact that the net provides low cost pretty safe ICTs (skype is notoriously 
hard to wiretap), thus the higher risks authoritarian regimes might need to take in perpetrating 
repression, the relative ease in accessing non-government controlled media (the 2011 Italian 
referenda have been praised in these terms), let alone the hope many have in seeing flash 
mobs and web 2.0 apps transform undecided subjects into active protesters – following the 
connection  between  informational  cascades  and  what  Susanne  Lohmann  viewed  as  peer 
pressure in pulling down the Berlin wall
4 – all this, and more, make for an undiscriminating 
halleluiah that, in some ways,  recall similarly overenthusiastic hopes following the “third 
wave” of democratization, named after Samuel Huntington’s 1991 best-seller. 
In February 2011, Manuel Castells – who wrote the famous information era-trilogy that 
turned  out  to  be  an  eye-opener  for  many  social  scientists  in  the  “networked  society”
5  – 
claimed: “these popular insurrections in the Arab world constitute a turning point in the social 
and political history of humanity. And perhaps the most important of the internet-led and 
facilitated changes in all aspects of life, society, the economy and culture. And this is just the 
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start”
6. This is consistent with his overall claim that “the process of formation and exercise of 
power relationships is decisively transformed in the new organisational and technological 
context derived from the rise of global digital networks of communication as the fundamental 
symbol-processing system of our time”.
7 By a similar token, Milad Doueihi, an analyst of 
digital cultures, sees that “la culture numérique est porteuse de changement radical (…). La 
Tunisie comme l’Egypte symbolisent ce changement porté par le numérique: quelques noms 
propres, un lieu et la foule”.
8 A fine observer of our time with the Frankfurt School’s interest 
for techniques, Jürgen Habermas prognosticated that “the Internet has certainly reactivated the 
grassroots of an egalitarian public”, even though he also pointed out that “the web can claim 
unequivocal democratic merits only for a special context: It can undermine the censorship of 
authoritarian regimes that try to control and repress public opinion. In the context of liberal 
regimes, the rise of millions of fragmented chat rooms across the world tend instead to lead to 
the fragmentation  of large but  politically  focused mass  audiences into a huge number of 
isolated issue publics”.
9 
It is noteworthy that the praise of the political consequences of the massive use of ICTs 
is occurring just as a wave of so-called cyber-pessimism is sweeping across many sectors of 
the digitally sensible world of culture. A closer look at “liberation technologies”
10 and the 
political  use  of  new  media  and  ICTs
11  suggest a more complicated reality: technological 
advances  are  no  substitute  for  human  wisdom.  Many  observe  how  “the  tools  of  modern 
communications  satisfy  as  wide  a  range  of  ambitions  and  appetites  as  their  20
th  century 
ancestors did, and many of these ambitions and appetites do not have anything to do with 
democracy”
12. As an example of the growing unease with the general celebratory mood, The 
Edge’s special 2010 issue should be mentioned, where John Markoff affirmed that, from 
Arpanet to the Internet, we are in the midst of a “post-industrial dystopia” in which the web is 
opening Pandora’s box. In the same period, Prospect published a much commented debate 
between Clay Shirky – inter alia author of the techno-optimistic Here Comes Everybody: The 
Power  of  Organizing  Without  Organizations  (2008)  –  and  Evgueni  Morozov,  author  of 
eloquently entitled The net delusion (2011) where the latter argues that the Internet is subject 
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to the power of the state and therefore is largely impotent as a mechanism for promoting 
democracy. He shows that, throughout the world, the Internet is (a) more likely to be used for 
entertainment purposes or as a global shopping mall (e.g. the current angry birds mania), (b) 
censored  in  ways  that  are  not  easily  surmountable  (e.g.  arrest  and  detainment  of  cyber-
dissidents), (c) used as a tool for propaganda (e.g. China’s 50 cent party or Hugo Chavez’s 
turn  over  from  netcensor  to  famous  twitter),  and  (d)  used  for  spying  on  dissidents:  in 
Belorussia,  for  instance,  the  authorities  started  surveilling  By_mob  where  the  community 
LiveJournal announced its meetings: not only did the Police arrest the demonstrators, but 
pictures were taken of the people present so they could be easily spotted on social media; in 
the “Twitter revolution” dissidents discussed relatively freely on Goodreads, away from their 
censors, until the Los Angeles Times published an article on the phenomenon. Authoritarian 
states  learn  pretty  quickly  and  Iranian  communications  officials  anonymously  created 
websites encouraging people to post pictures of the protests so they could identify, track and, 
sometimes, detain the protesters.
13 
The aim of this paper is not to fue l the enthusiasm of those who see a new form of 
democracy burgeoning, nor to take the conservative stance  sub soli nihil novi or drop the 
realist remark that technology does not only change the world but, as in all feedback loops, 
“the  world  is  changing  internet”.
14  Rather,  this  paper  will  outline  how  we  can  possibly 
address in problematically fertile terms the question of “what does e add to democracy?” 
 
II. E-democracy between Science, Technology and Politics 
I will start by stressing that for e-democracy to be an interesting problem for philosophical 
enquiry it needs to constitute a problem (i) rich in consequences, (ii) clearly defined and/or 
definable,  (iii)  accessible,  in  the  meaning  easy  to  understand  but  hard  to  solve,  (iv) 
intrinsically open, leaving disagreement as a viable option.  This paper shall evidently not 
transform the topic, which is still something of a moving target, into such a well-defined 
problem of philosophical enquiry since such a task goes well beyond the purposes of an 
introductory workshop but, at least, I shall attempt to draw a conceptual map of questions that 
need to be addressed – or better, of clusters of micro-problems – and that cannot be easily 
articulated unless we take the ”e” of democracy seriously.  
Moreover, a word on democracy as a form of government is needed. It has over the ages 
been  associated  with  a  variety  of  adjectives:  direct,  representative,  procedural,  formal, 
substantial, social, liberal, constitutional, epistemic, deliberative, participative… and last but 
                                                           
13 See Schmidt, Cohen (note 1) at 82. 
14 See Bremmer (note12) at 91.  
5   
not least “real”. The conceptual typologies of democratic regimes (parliamentary/presidential, 
bi- and multipartisan, coalescent, consociated, concordant, populist, plebiscitarian, polyarchic 
etc.) also span over a vast amount of different organisations, just like the broad variety of 
historical experiences associated with it, does. Some even go as far as to claim that we are 
dealing with an “essentially contested concept”.
15 There is, however, reason to believe this is 
not so, and the 20
th century tradition of though in theory of democracy offers some evidence 
in  that  direction.
16  For our present purposes I shall keep the broad connotations in the 
background  and  keep  the  constraints  to  a  minimum  (that  some  will  surely  feel  are 
embarrassingly low), i.e. conceiving democracy quite generically to be a method for taking 
collective decisions, that historically relates to a set of values (e.g. peaceful resolution of 
conflicts) and that has a set of social conditions (e.g. formal citizenship status) as well as a set 
of legally guaranteed preconditions (e.g. freedom of speech). I am aware of the imperfect 
nature of the characterisation but it leaves us, in tackling e -democracy, with a sufficiently 
open texture definition to take in most practices, experiences, and ide as associated with the 
(often  equally  unspecified)  term  “e-democracy”.
17  A  reason  for  adopting  this  generic 
conception is that, like in many other practical fields of enquiry, methodological holism keeps 
together the various problematic aspects raised by a topic so as to avoid creating an epistemic 
level  of  analysis  that  misses  out  on  important  observables;  such  as  those,  in  our  case 
connected to e-democracy even though not equal to its institutional manifestations (e.g. E-
parliament, E-government etc.), such as first and foremost an accessible, non-censured and 
neutral web. 
Let  us  start  by  two  observations  that  do  not  seem  to  have  been  properly  connected 
hitherto: the first concerns technology and the second politics. 
The  first  observation  is  nicely  presented  with  a  quote  by  the  father  of  cybernetics, 
Norbert Weiner: “It has long been clear to me that the modern ultra-rapid computing machine 
was in principle an ideal central nervous system to an apparatus for automatic control (…). 
Long before Nagasaki and the public awareness of the atomic bomb, it had occurred to me 
that we were here in the presence of another social potentiality of unheard-of importance for 
                                                           
15 Bernard Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction, OUP, Oxford 2002. 
16 E.g. Hans Kelsen, Von Wert und Wesen der Demokratie (1929), Eng. trad. On the essence and value of 
democracy. In: Weimar. A Jurisprudence of Crisis, eds. A. Jacobson and B. Schlink, University of California 
Press, LA 2000; Robert Dahl, A preface to democratic theory, Chicago University Press, Chicago 1956; 
Norberto Bobbio, The Future of Democracy, Polity Press, London 1987; org. Einaudi, Torino 1984; Giovanni 
Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Chatham House, Chatham, N.J 1987. 
17 E.g. Thomas Zittel, Parliaments and the Internet: A Perspective on the State of Research. In: Parliaments in the 
Digital Age, ed. C. Leston-Bandeira, S. Ward et al., Oxford Internet Institute, Forum Discussion Report 13, Jan 
2008.  
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good and evil”.
18 This first observation can readily be reformulated as follows: ICT is the 
fastest growing technology in history, “playing a cultural role far more influential than that of 
mills in the Middle Ages, mechanical clocks in the 17
th century, and the loom or the steam 
engine in the age of the industrial revolution”
19 and this has led to the appearance of the 
infosphere, i.e. the environment in which millions of people spend their time nowadays. Only 
blind thoughtlessness could suppose that this has no impact on the relationships among people 
and the stewardship of our communities. 
The  second  observation  concerns  the  general  silence  of  standard  political  and  legal 
theory on the impact of technology on politics and law. Just to mark the point: for instance if 
one turns to John Rawls, an often acclaimed giant of contemporary political philosophy, he 
does not have much to say on the issue: in Political liberalism
20 he feels it is sufficient to 
stress that the rules of evidence are different in a scientific society from those of democratic 
politics. Many democratic theorists agree on this point. It is therefore not surprising that, even 
as the neologism was  emerging, Seymour Lipset’s  The Encyclopedia of Democracy from 
1995 has no entry for e-democracy. A quick look around in mainstream political theory shows 
an embarrassing void when it comes to making sense of what is going in the infosphere. 
Conversely, among the fields of research that are more conversant with e-democracy, such as 
theory of social communication and science and technology studies, seem largely unaware of 
the body of work that has been steadily growing in legal and political theory concerning the 
concept, limits and preconditions of democracy. 
A similar point can be made for legal theory: An example is the fact that legal theorists 
often view technology in traditional terms of law being (merely) a system of social control 
through the determination of sanctions. This tendency can be found among traditional positive 
lawyers as well as among critical theorists that build on the Foucaultian notion of regulation 
as  understood  prevailingly  in  juridical  terms.  However,  it  should  be  clear  by  now  that 
technology inscribes and constitutes as much as it prescribes. The lack of determinate and 
separate institutions of enforcement does not necessarily invalidate the idea of technological 
regulation:  “Rather  than  relying  on  sanctions  imposed  after  the  fact  to  enforce  its  rules, 
[software] simply prevents the forbidden behaviour from occurring.
21 This is the key idea 
behind  the  aggressive  digital  technologies  developed  by  some  corporations  in  the 
entertainment business that forbear the “final user” from making “free use” of the product that 
                                                           
18 Norbert Weiner, Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, MIT press, 
Cambridge (Mass.) 1948, 27-28. 
19 Luciano Floridi, The Philosophy of Information, OUP, Oxford 2011, 5. 
20 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia Univ. Press, New York 1996. 
21 James Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, Yale Law Journal, 114 (2005) 1723.  
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has  been  purchased,  with  the  aim  to  hinder  file-sharing  or  mash  up:  the  aim  of  TPM 
(technological  protection  measures)  or  DRM  (digital  rights  management)  is  to 
technologically prevent the very possibility of copyright infringement. 
Of  course  this  does  not  imply  that  political  theory  has  not  taken  “technique”  and 
“technology” into account: There is a longstanding tradition in critical theory focusing on 
Technik  (e.g.  Habermas’  Technology  and  Science  as  Ideology),  and  many  interesting 
investigations of the relationship of between democracy and science (e.g. Dewey, Pierce) just 
to mention two directions of study. A recurrent motif is also how technology and human 
agency have an impact on one another – and the old spectres of determinism and reductionism 
that has always haunted social sciences can sometimes loom here. Nevertheless, «one must 
mark  the  response  of  Critical  Theory  to  these  [technological]  changes  as  an  intellectual 
failure, not least because they have only a remote connection to actual science».
22 Perhaps in 
connection to this circumstance, mainstream political theorists, in developing 20
th century 
democratic theory, usually viewed “science” – that, in our time, is inherently intertwined with 
technology – as playing a role in actual political settings such as bureaucracies, committees, 
counselling-bodies, independent authorities etc. but in a merely “instrumental” way, i.e. as 
playing “a role that is more or less akin to that played by a calculating machine (…). It must 
be  conceded  that  governments  have  a  need  for  technical  knowledge  just  as  government 
buildings  needs  plumbing.  But  no-one  imagines  that  political  theory  has  failed    (…)  to 
recognize the significance of plumbing. (…) It is commonly asserted that the goose-necked 
drainpipe did more to improve sanitation and consequently to lower mortality than all of the 
scientific discoveries of the 19
th century combined. So perhaps plumbing deserves to be taken 
very seriously (…). This line of argumentation, however attractive, is simply wrong”.
23 One 
of the reasons why democratic theory did not take on the challenge of accounting for science 
and technology in politics depends on the very tension between technocracy and democracy, 
stretching back at least to Saint Simon: “democracy is based on the hypothesis that everybody 
can  decide  on  everything.  Technocracy,  on  the  contrary,  claims  that  only  the  few  that 
understand the issue should decide”.
24 
Now, to the amazement of many digitally naturalized, there is a significant difference 
between  information  technology  and  plumbing.  This  difference,  which  seems  to  be 
technological at heart, implies that the conceptual distinction between Zweckrationalität and 
Geltungsrationalität is getting blurred. Heidegger who, in his acclaimed essay, The Question 
                                                           
22 Stephen P. Turner, Liberal Democracy 3.0, Sage, London 2003, 3. 
23 See Turner (note 22) at 4. 
24 See Bobbio (note 16) at 22.  
8   
Concerning Technology, made this point clear – albeit in his customary oracle-style – by 
claiming  that  “the  essence  of  technology  is  not  technological”:
25  modern  technology,  as 
opposed to premodern techniques, regulates human life through “enframing” (Gestell) and 
thus cannot be exhaustively explained in the functionalities it offers. It is not “neutral” in any 
way near the goosenecked drainpipe and its constitutive aspect is today known in social and 
communication  theory  in  terms  of  “framing”.  As  Erving  Goffman  explains  in  Frame 
Analysis:  An  essay  on  the  organization  of  experience,  a  frame  consists  of  a  schema  of 
interpretation that individuals rely on to understand and respond to events. It relates to the 
construction  and  presentation  of  a  fact  or  issue  "framed"  from  a  particular  perspective. 
Framing is an effective heuristic, i.e. mental shortcut or cognitive bias, affecting the outcome 
of choice problems to the extent that several of the classic axioms of rational choice do not 
hold.
26  This  dimension  is  to  a  large  extent  neglected,  if  not  occulted,  by  traditional 
mainstream legal and political theory that classify and analyse forms of government, such as 
democracy. 
It is noteworthy that t he claim that (information) technology is neutral continues to 
pervade the debate on the political dimension of the digital revolution. The claim is usually 
made by pointing to the use made of a determinate technology by groups that are ascribed to 
different ends of the political spectrum, as if the traditional political spectrum right/left would 
be the ultimate orientation points in any possible discussion of the political use of technology. 
An example is the statement that Brazilian ecologists use GoogleMaps for showing the effects 
of deforestation, but GoogleMaps is also being used by the Russian extreme right movement 
against illegal immigration for determining the location of ethnic minorities in big cities.
27  
To rephrase it, technological information h as a semantic dimension, involving “giving 
and making sense” of “reality”. Information as semantic content can be seen as the upper 
level of the technological complex that marks our age.
28 Epistemologically, “information” 
however does not mean “belief” nor “knowledge”, yet it is distinguishable from mere data, 
the uninterpreted differences of symbols or signs. Ontologically, “information is information, 
not matter or energy”.
29 For our present purposes, let us adopt Floridi’s terms: “semantic 
                                                           
25 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology And Other Essays, Harper & Row, New York 1977. 
26 Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making, McGraw-Hill, Columbus 1993; Amos 
Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, Science, 211 (1981) 453-
458. 
27 Eugeny Morozov quoted in Olivier Postel-Vinay, Pour en finir avec le cyberoptimisme, Dossier Books n. 12, 
april 2010, 22. 
28 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Market and Freedom, Yale 
Univ. Press, New Haven 2006. 
29 See Weiner (note 18) at 12.  
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information  is  well-formed,  meaningful  and  truthful  data”.
30  This  semantic  dimension  of 
technology should keep us from falling flatly into the widespread belief that technology is a 
means to the service of human ends, a form of passive universe of “objects” whose functions 
and  purposes  are  shaped  by  the  pursuits  of  humans  in  the  contexts  where  they  occur. 
“Artefacts qua means are never neutral. They make some things possible and exclude others. 
Artefacts  embody  values  or  ‘have  politics’  (…).  Technology  is  not  exogenous  to  human 
agency, as the contrast of humans to machines may initially suggest. Technology does not 
constitute a force that simply has to be used, resisted, bypassed or altogether avoided”.
31 
Today, there is of course a burgeoning contemporary literature on e-democracy but it can be 
distinguished from previous strains of research because, most of the time, it uses, at some 
level of analysis, the idea that the technology we are dealing with should be understood and 
grasped in terms of “information”, not mere tools.
32 Our starting point, thus, is that “the 
modern alliance between sophia and techne has reached a new level of synergy with the 
computer revolution”.
33 
 
III. Mapping problems: what is new and what is not? 
I suggest  the following non-exhaustive map of problems  that are implied by the term e-
democracy in today’s debate. I shall try to spell out the relations of political thinking with its 
“cousins”, the other branches of practical thought. A cascade of issues, associated with e-
democracy in its broadly construed meaning, will be stressed and assigned to respective levels 
of change. Some are partially convergent, yet most dissimilar. All push for reconsideration of 
the contemporary dialectic between means and ends. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
30 See Floridi (note 19) at 31. 
31 Jannis Kallinikos, Governing Through Technology. Information Artefacts and Social Practice, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke 2010, 3. 
32 The difference between a tool or instrument and a machine consists in the difference of reliance on 
individually taken decisions: «A decision is required at every moment, the instrument being manipulated in 
different ways in accordance with the result so far attained. Such decisions may be vested in the instrument 
itself. If it is, the instrument then attains the status of a machine. If the user makes all the decisions the 
instrument is only a tool. The distinction between a tool and a machine is primarily that in the former a decision 
is involved at every moment and in the latter there is an independent functioning which permits the decision to 
be made by the natural run of the instrument» (Peter Weiss, An Introduction to a Study of Instruments, 
Philosophy of Science (1941), Vol. 8, 295). 
33 See Floridi (note 19) at 27.  
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The  basic  distinction  among  the  different  levels  of  questions  is  between  (a)  which 
features and characteristics appear to be in continuity with past experiences, conferring on the 
hyphen  of  e-democracy  a  conjunctive  function  and  (b)  what  features  and  characteristics 
appear to be in discontinuity with past experiences, turning the same hyphen into a disjunctive 
sign. A second level of fundamental distinctions can be made within (a) and (b).  
Under (a), we should distinguish between (a1) outlooks that do not account for the digital 
revolution and therefore are not equipped to operate with, or even notice, the current changes, 
and (a2) theories that uphold that we are witnessing new versions of old problems, yet refuse 
to consider these issues as offering unique features. I shall call the first outlook scholastic and 
the  second  traditionalist.  Scholasticism  here  stands  for  what  socio-linguists  call  “internal 
discourse”, i.e. meta-theoretically acritical (or pedantic) attachment to a theoretical setting 
that ignores new data in the sense that it does not make use of a level of abstraction that turns 
the  infosphere,  and  what  is  happening  within  it,  into  an  observable  of  the  system.  Most 
political doctrines that are currently ignoring the informational turn have high probability of 
performing well in this category, with the consequent risk of ending up on the Hegelian dump 
of history. Perhaps a strict realist approach to political relationships that centres on the idea of 
le pouvoir pour le pouvoir, where power is sought for its own sake, and that hence does not 
take into account the declared values of those who engage in the digitally shaped political  
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practice  could  be  ascribed  to  (a1)  since  such  a  stance  fails  to  perceive  the  ubiquity  and 
pervasiveness of digitally re-wired collective endeavours (e.g. Ushahidi): It is just blind to the 
new environment. The same goes for political theories that do not account for the huge impact 
on policy-making the Internet and the web has had over the last decades. But also among 
approaches that have been investigating the political scene after the advent of the Internet 
often rely on comfortable convictions of “politics as usual”: cyberspace “will be moulded by 
the  everyday  struggle  for  wealth  and  power”
34  so  that  current  political  relationships  and 
power distributions will ultimately be replicated online, opposing the view that the ICTs offer 
potential for radical redistribution of power. Similarly, Matthew Hindman, in The Myth of 
Digital Democracy, after tracking nearly three million Web pages, contends “that the beliefs 
that the Internet is democratizing politics are simply wrong”
35 and labels “Googlearchy” the 
current state of the Internet that would have done little to broaden political discourse but in 
fact empowers a small set of elites – some new, but most familiar. This is a perspective 
perfectly adaptable to Schumpeterian elitist theories of democracy.
36 
Are political theories, and theories of democracy in particular, that uphold the claim of 
the neutrality of technology to be ascribed to (a1) or (a2)? There is a vast portion of scholarly 
attention being directed to the “crisis of democracy” that had been growing steadily over the 
years: does this stream of research offer outlooks that should be placed under (a1) or (a2)? 
Political theory deals with underlying basic concepts such as obedience, legitimacy, order, 
justice that have transcended the passing of ages – from the classical age to the modern age – 
as  well  as  the  passing  of  forms  of  government,  from  monarchy,  oligarchy/aristocracy  to 
democracy.  A  fundamental  question  for  political  theory  in  this  new  setting  would  be  to 
investigate the question of “diffusion of power”: is there such a thing? In other words, is 
“power”  more  or  less  “powerful”  when  distributed?  Are  distributed  power  structures 
necessarily decentralized? Should we abandon the idea of a necessary link between force and 
power? If power is not exercised only through coercion, but also through the construction of 
meaning, does greater pluralism in semantic appliances imply a different configuration of the 
techno-social “relational capacity to influence asymmetrically the decisions of other social 
actor(s)”, pursuant to one definition of power in the networked society?
37 Moreover, do such 
fundamental political categories, that seem well suited for being positioned under (a1) really 
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fit there, or should we add a new category or modify existing ones? For instance, how is the 
notion of “consent” to be understood in a setting where “informed consent” is increasingly 
complex to grasp and offers little resemblance to past forms? How many of you actually read 
the juridical contracts before you click “accept”? Another example of calling into question 
fundamental categories of political thinking concerns a major assumption of existing theories 
of  political  organisation,  i.e.  that  a  political  community  implies  borders  (including 
cosmopolitanism that does not, contrarily to what it might seem at a first glance, exclude 
internal  federal  settings):  Does  the  trans-border  effects  of  cyberspace  call  for  a 
problematisation of such an assumption? Many contemporary theories of the so-called “global 
civil society”, like many McLuhan-inspired “global village”-theories, seem to engage in such 
a direction, whether implicitly or explicitly. Does cyberspace call for a rethinking of what has 
been called the “democratic boundary problem”?
38 The Internet is a medium that does not 
obey a geographical fractioning of the kind we have been used to in political gerrymandering 
– IP addresses are logical not geographical places –, how does this affect how we determine 
the “sphere of law” over a determinate community? The underlying idea of “space” relevant 
for political purposes perhaps needs recasting. 
Before being raised in  relation  to  politics, the outlook offered by (a2)  was  raised in 
relation to other realms of practical knowledge such as ethics and law. Already in 1985, 
ethicists were engaging in what came to be known as the “uniqueness debate”: on the one 
hand,  James  Moor  suggested  that  we  think  of  the  ethical  questions  surrounding  ICT 
technology as policy vacuums,
39 while Deborah Johnson defended the traditionalist account, 
based on the principle of analogy, according to which existing moral norms and principles can 
be applied to the new situations.
40 In the field of legal science, while David Post stressed the 
discontinuity-reading,
41 Jack Goldsmith embraced such a traditionalist account where the new 
“crimes”  emerging  with  the  Internet  would  have  been  subsumed  into  already  existing 
categories.
42 Is it warranted to suspect that a similar traditionalist outlook informs many of 
today’s  e-democracy  sceptics?  “Traditionalist”  here  does  not  have  any  politically  loaded 
meaning since it merely indicates the cognitive and epistemological ability of a theory already 
in  use  to  account  for  upcoming  facts.  This  implies  that  the  key  difference  between 
traditionalists  and  scholastics  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  first  accept  the  challenge  of  the 
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information  age  but  believe  to  have  the  answers,  while  the  second  does  not  accept  the 
challenge.  Traditionalist  accounts  can  be  important  both  as  descriptive  and  as  normative 
accounts. Descriptively traditionalist outlooks often correctly grasp the ways in which policy 
decisions are made in practice as people are getting used to new technology (early stages 
descriptivism), and, normatively, such  accounts  appropriately recommends  stocktaking on 
past experiences. Yet the inherent risk with such outlooks is that they may overstretch the 
principle  of  analogy,  suggesting  a  mechanical  process  of  extending  knowledge  and  thus 
obscuring important decisions that are being taken in the design of new technologies that will 
be used in operating within the “politically loaded” world of experience. 
Under (b), we should keep separate two positions that share, contrarily to positions under 
(a), the idea that computers  have  such an impact  on the political  relationships  of human 
beings so as to warrant independent investigation of the “uniqueness” of political cyberspace 
and  democracy  in  the  digital  age.  Those  who  call  for  such  independent  investigation, 
nevertheless, develop different perspectives: the first (b1) focuses on the “transformation” 
brought on by digitalisation while the second (b2) concentrates on the “revolution” going on. 
Just as the information age of the “interconnected estate” has impacted on other branches of 
practical thought, such as ethics, economics and the law, the outlook under (b1) holds that we 
are witnessing new versions of old problems, and the novelty does not only consist in re-
contextualization but in the fact that the issue raises unprecedented or unique features. 
The difference between positions under (a2) and (b1) can thus be spelled out: whereas 
(a2) claims that we are witnessing new versions of old problems, yet refuses to treat these 
problems as offering unique features, (b1) claims that not only are we confronted with novel 
questions but we could not correctly understand and respond to these challenges if we do not 
take  into  account  the  specificities  of  information  technology  (such  as  its  malleability, 
ubiquity, easily scalable networks, the “long tail”, the emergence of collective intelligence, 
velocity of transformation or “Moore’s law” etc.). This means, in other words, that if we want 
to understand a position as being related to (a2) or (b1) we should ask “What is it about 
information technology, as opposed to firearms, or washing machines or light bulbs, that 
creates  political  issues  and  uncertainty  about  democratic  matters?”  Are  current  problems 
affecting  democracy  in  the  digital  age  really  different  in  the  sense  that  they  require 
development of a “new form of democracy”? Or are ICT-related political issues simply old 
political problems in a new guise? 
In order to better illustrate the difference between the transformative potential (b1) of 
Internet  politics  and  its  revolutionary  thrust  (b2),  a  quick  comparative  look  at  the  other  
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branches of practical philosophy is useful. Probably the first realm of practical knowledge that 
took the computer technology seriously was ethics: since the 80ies computer ethics has been 
addressing issues such as: Is it ethical for a website to place a cookie on the hard drive of 
those who visit the site? Is data mining morally acceptable? Are Internet domain names being 
distributed  in  a  fair  way?  Should  surgery  be  performed  remotely  with  medical  imaging 
technology?  Should  computer  graphical  recreations  of  incidents,  such  as  automobile 
accidents, be allowed to be used in courtrooms? Is it right for an individual to reproduce and 
alter an artistic image electronically that was originally created by someone else? 
Economists took up the challenge with the new economy turn: post-industrialism became 
evident  for  the  larger  public  with  the  dot-bubble  in  the  early  2000s.  The  transformative 
aspects of the Internet emerged in economics as its ability to reduce internal administration 
costs, speed up communication, reduce costs of transmitting data: all aspects that meant the 
reduction of the number of middle-hands between original providers of goods and services 
and the final consumer. The futuristically minded understood that the disintermediation would 
challenge  traditional  economic  functions  of  wholesalers  and  retailers,  implying  fewer  big 
malls,  offices,  publishers  etc.  This  spotlight  on  renewed  economic  functions  is  a  good 
example  of  the  outlook  focusing  on  “transformation”:  It  does  not  yet  imply  anything 
revolutionary, but it means that “business as usual” has to take into account the new setting. 
On the political side, this trend was picked up by the transition to e-government in public 
administrations  (e.g.  electronic  service  delivery,  the  development  of  standardized 
management tools for legal documentation and information retrieval, such as XML standards; 
ZTTs in surveillance and congestion management; smart cards in public transport such as the 
London Oystercard): “the advent of the digital era is now the most general, pervasive, and 
structurally distinctive influence on how governance arrangements are changing in advanced 
industrialized  states”.
43  E-government  streamlines,  standardizes,  and  modifies  public 
administrations but does not pretend to create e-democracy ex novo. 
The transformative potential of the Internet also hit lawyers, prompted by the appearance 
of new “computer crimes” and the avalanche of law-making from the mid-90ies onwards 
concerning the regulation of the new technology (e.g. 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
that set the irresponsibility regime for ISPs without which much of the web 2.0 could not have 
developed, with Del.icio.us, Essembly, FB, Flickr, Gather, MySpace, Partybuilder, YouTube, 
Ning, Metacafe, Revver, Blip.tv, CHBN, vSocial, Tagworld, Collectivex, Bebo, Care2, Hi5, 
Xanga...  All  this  can  readily  be  understood  in  the  framework  of  (b1):  the  transformative 
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potential of the digital age was firmly grasped and new ways of tackling the updated versions 
of traditional ethical, economic and legal issues quickly developed. 
 
IV. How has the transformation hit the political realm? 
Today  the  transformative  potential  of  information  technology  appears  when  we  consider 
problems of how we should best update realms of political theory with lengthy histories, such 
as  (c1)  fundamental  rights,  (c2)  institutionalized  power,  foremost  that  of  the  State;  (c3) 
political participation, including parties, movements etc.; (c4) citizen education, including 
socialization practices of political relevance (e.g. consent-formation, political identification 
practices…). All have, at some level of abstraction, a connection to (e)-democracy. “One of 
the weaknesses of Internet studies is a failure to link research to existing literatures or place it 
within  current  political  contexts”.
44  This  implies  that  both  futuristic  optimists  and  realist 
normalizers fail to highlight that, under the present circumstances, some political institutions 
might benefit while other might not, some communicational settings may act as a catalyst for 
integrating some ICTs into participation and some may not. Scales of grey matter nonetheless. 
Here I shall briefly highlight some of the questions that can be raised in relation to points 
mentioned. 
 
1. Get the Balance Right 
In relation to fundamental rights (c1) the digital age has changed profoundly the ways in 
which we balance relative fundamental rights against each other: Think about freedom of 
speech and privacy. It is becoming all the more evident that, once we enter the infosphere, the 
traditional  habeas  corpus, to  be able to  offer the  guarantees, safeguards  and liberties  we 
expect from it, needs to be understood (in addition and beyond the traditional approach) in 
terms of habeas data.
45 In other words, in a world where YouTube serves 2 billion videos a 
day, Twitter registers 750 twits a second, and 2.5 billion photos are being posted on FB a 
month,  the  balancing  of  freedom  of  speech  and  privacy  has  changed  substantially:  in 
accordance with (a2), privacy has not ceased to be the “right to be let alone” in the meaning 
of the right to non-intromission (e.g. secrecy of correspondence and of one’s home), but it has 
also  assumed a previously unknown meaning of a  right to  control  over  the treatment  of 
personal  data.  Think  for  example  of  the  recent  German  protests  about  google  streetview 
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violating people’s privacy by filming homes, streets, cars etc. Perhaps the most emblematic 
case  of  the  new  forms  of  tensions  in  balancing  fundamental  rights  such  as  privacy  and 
freedom of speech is offered by sns such as FB: is the user overexposed? If so is it due to the 
quality and type of data left online or should we understand it to be the user’s “intention”? 
How much intentionality can be legitimately read into “like”-ing?  How does the notion of 
“informed consent” change in such a setting? Such issues have become urgent with the use of 
data mining techniques that enable sns to “treat” such quantities of data as to allow statistical 
retrieval of unreleased information: “non-sensible data” such as your zip code for instance 
may “tell” if you are more likely to purchase wine or beer.  To what extent should these 
practices  be allowed? What  kind  of supervision should data mining be subjected? Today 
Europe’s independent authorities on privacy are charged with the supervision in Workgroup 
ex art.29. Should such controlling bodies be held accountable to voters? Do they differ from 
other kinds of independent agencies? 
An over-inclusive conception of privacy, on the other hand, raises issues of yet another 
kind:  could  not  privacy  then  be  used  as  a  pretext  for  non-proportionate  limitations  on 
information lawful to spread? Yet another aspect of the habeas data protection is how to 
balance  the  right  to  safeguard  one’s  reputation  and  honour  without  impinging  on  other’s 
freedom of speech. Many, including the UN in a recent report from July 2011, believe that 
defamation  should  be  decriminalized  in  the  new  informational  environment.  This  has  an 
evident political consequence in democratic regimes since building trust in the public domain 
is strictly linked to ability of public authorities to maintain a good reputation in a free speech 
environment. Should these rights be balanced differently when a party belongs to the political 
arena? Another problem of balancing digitally informed fundamental rights is that of freedom 
of  speech  and  “decency”:  many  (liberal)  states  limit  freedom  of  speech  in  the  name  of 
morality and common decency. However, common decency is a sensible and highly variable 
threshold in plural and multicultural societies: when should it trump freedom of speech? In 
addition, governments often put pressure on ISPs to adopt more restrictive policies, including 
filtering online content. Such a case was the removal of FB photos of breastfeeding mothers. 
Are such measures justified? The fight against child pornography has repeatedly turned out to 
be a "trojan horse" suitable for concealing various repressive measures that had nothing to do 
with  fighting  pornography:  e.g.  entire  IP  addresses  have  been  obscured  deleting  lawful 
material  as  well. Can such a throwing out  the baby with  the bathwater be motivated? A 
similar problem of balancing rights is offered by the case of confidential information: the 
principle of publicity would require there to be no "state secrets" but since there are, the  
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tension between freedom of speech, mirrored in the right to information, clash with protection 
of confidentiality. How should the balance be struck? This raises the question of protecting 
whistleblowers,  those  who  take  risks  in  order  to  disclose  confidential  information  to  the 
benefit of the community (e.g. Wikileaks poses a similar problem:  Benkler forthcoming). 
Chapter IV of the recent UN report on Free speech highlighted this transformative dimension 
of this core fundamental right, essential to liberal democratic society, by outlining some of the 
ways in which States are increasingly censoring information online, namely through: arbitrary 
blocking  or  filtering  of  content;  criminalization  of  legitimate  expression;  imposition  of 
intermediary liability;  disconnecting users from  Internet  access,  including on the basis of 
intellectual  property  rights  law;  cyber-attacks;  and  inadequate  protection  of  the  right  to 
privacy and data protection; unclear responsibilities for ISPs.
46 
Let us stress why there is room for analysis belonging to (b1) here and not only re -
editions of settings under (a2): For instance, to show why the analogy with traditional media 
is insufficient and/or misleading for regulating the current blogosphere emphasis should be 
laid on the fact that, even though bloggers often have journalistic statuses, gaining access to 
political events and press conferences, they are fairly different from traditional journalists as 
far as editing issues are concerned. Another, yet interconnected aspect is the status of e -
participation movements: the US netroots movement MoveOn is a 527 group and thus legally 
defined as non-partisan: how should such advocacy groups be legally  framed in the new 
environment? Conversely, the problem of non e-commerce protected ISPs such as YouTube 
that in Europe is not covered by the ISP immunity given to e-com is connected to free speech. 
To give a practical example of why the analogy with traditional media is misleading, let 
us  consider  the  recently  discussed  Italian  proposal  of  “transposing”  existing  freedom  of 
speech norms to new media (cf. disegno di legge sulle intercettazioni 2009). This example 
shows why it is urgent to distinguish classical features under (a) and unprecedented features 
under (b). The proposed bill suggested to apply to bloggers the same rules that are applied to 
newspapers  and  TV-editors:  the  Italian  legal  system  confer  upon  traditional  media  an 
obligation to grant the person who considers herself to have had her reputation soiled a “right 
to reply” within 48 hours. Non-compliance would entail fines for individual bloggers up to 
12500 euros. It does not make sense to apply such a norm to websites and blogs since the 
Internet is a medium that does not follow the parcelling out by the hours that traditional media 
work with (indeed, new media have an a-synchronic and highly variable organisation such as 
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real time, on demand…): it is not hard to understand that such an analogous extension of 
previously existing norms such as the traditionally conceived (one-to-many) “right to reply” 
would kill off the blogosphere since bloggers would need to renounce to any other activity or 
continue their activity as potential legal infringers – a risk few would take. Italy’s lawmakers 
have also suggested (decreto Romani of 2009) a requirement of a ministerial authorization for 
all streaming videos: another proposal that is incompatible with freedom of speech in the 
digital world, too cumbersome for individual prosumers. 
Since fundamental rights of this kind (that  guarantee so-called first-wave liberties or 
negative  liberties)  are  essential  preconditions  for  democracy,  we  must  understand  e-
democracy to be involved with questions arising in this field as well, and here political theory 
has  to  develop  frameworks  in  pace  with  the  technological  developments  because  it  is 
currently  underequipped  to  provide  answers  on  how  to  balance  rights  in  this  new 
environment. To what extent does liberal theories of rights accommodate for the Internet Bill 
of Rights-movement? 
 
2. Transformations to the State and Institutions 
In relation to (c2), the power of institutions, and in particular of the State, is changing. On one 
hand, some of the changes we are witnessing are transformative but hardly related to ICTs, on 
other hand, some other trends, related to ICTs are unprecedented. 
As far as the first are concerned, there are a series of transformative trends that may 
perhaps be amplified by the Internet but that are not “new”; e.g. there is of course the long-
standing tradition in political theory that over the 20
th century focused on the transformations 
of the state and the erosion of the Westphalia paradigm. Most tendencies of state erosion 
might be amplified but cannot be said to be “unprecedented” as such. Perhaps it is true that 
“in the interconnected estate, a virtual space that is constrained by different national laws but 
not  national  boundaries,  there  can  be  no  equivalent  to  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia”.
47  Yet 
political theory has been reflecting on this tendency of erosion of the public/private, in/out-
divides for decades. And there is, indeed, food for thought on the topic: A good example of 
the kind of post-statual blurring of genres that cannot find easy accommodation in traditional 
frameworks  is  the  GNI  –  Global  Network  Initiative  –  that  brings  together  human  rights 
groups,  investors,  academics  and  companies  and  has  published  specific  guidelines  on 
promoting freedom of expression. Another interesting case of a private company having a 
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(para)public function is the ICANN that distribute domain names among other things.
48 Many 
more cases could be cited. Add to this, phenomena such as the outsourcing of censure from 
governments to ISPs, partly as a consequence of the gatekeeping role exercised by some key 
players, such as Google for instance:  This, in turn, opens up questions such as does holding 
intermediaries liable for the content disseminated by their users lead to self -protective and 
over-broad private censorship without the due process of the law? OpenNet lists the attempts 
of censuring the Net that have no basis in judiciary rulings ( U.N. guidelines to defend free 
expression claim censorship of content online must be transparent and enforced only through 
the courts). These are pressing issues but could be framed within the tren d that investigates 
how the lines of private and public are getting increasingly blurred: the digital environment 
might just strengthen an already existing trend. Many empirical scholars in political science 
have argued that we are assisting to enforcement  of previous trends: early evidence of e -
participation  indicated  “a  deepening  of  activism  among  the  already  engaged,  but  only  a 
marginal mobilization role in relation to new audiences. Overall, ICTs seem to be accelerating 
some of the trends of the pre-internet era such as individualization and disaggregation”.
49 On 
such a reading, the Internet does not much more than accelerate trends that brought on “post-
democracy”,
50 e.g. fall in party and trade union membership, the lack of satisfaction with 
traditional parties and the rise of so-called protest business,
51 an increasing focus on single-
issue campaigns, ephemeral mobilization practices. These problems of “mature democracies” 
have  roots  in  the  pre-digital  age  and  “the  arrival  of  the  internet  into  the  midst  of  these 
upheavals has added a further layer to debates about the role of political organizations”.
52 The 
early days that stressed the risks of electronic populism
53 did not discover something new but 
rather added a dose of tech-determinism to the already on-going sufferings of representative 
democracy.
54 
Conversely, we are also assisting to trends that embody the truly transformative potential 
of the digital age in the realm of politics: think of data-veillance and new surveillance studies 
for instance.  Dataveillance refers to the  automated  and systematic use of personal data 
systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more 
persons  and  comprises  a  wide  range  of  techniques  ( Front-End  Verification,  computer 
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matching, data trail, biometrics:  Clarke  2006).  Now, if traditional surveillance was  'close 
observation, especially of a suspected person', the new forms of surveillance that information 
technology enables is applied, beyond persons, to places, networks and categories of persons 
(e.g. profiling): the new social surveillance can be defined as, "scrutiny through the use of 
technical  means  to  extract  or  create  personal  or  group  data,  whether  from  individuals  or 
contexts".
55  If surveillance has been in constant expansion over the last centuries,
56  the 
microchip and the computer have substantially impacted on the centrality of information in 
the workings of contemporary society: just think of CCTVs, smart cards in work places, 
electronic location monitoring, DNA analysis, drug tests, brain scans for lie detection, thermal 
imaging etc. Traditionally surveillance involved close observation by a person not a machine; 
there was a clear distinction between agent and subject of surveillance; it was generally non -
cooperative; visible, manifest and usually coercive; it was more fragmented; whereas today it 
is carried out by ICTs, the watcher/watched relation is blurred (e.g. self -surveillance and 
cooperative surveillance), it has low visibility in disguised and routinized monitoring of 
everyday activities (e.g., use of a credit card for purchases automatically conveys information 
about consumption, time and location); it is comprehensive (the ratio of what the person 
knows about herself relative to what the surveilling organization knows is lower than in the 
past). There can be little doubt th at major changes have occurred. However, the normative 
implications of these are mixed and dependent on the technology in question and evaluative 
frameworks. Politically salient issues are raised by the absence of discrimination between 
suspects and non-suspects (surveillance technologies are often applied categorically, e.g., all 
employees are drug tested or all travellers searched). 
Another transformative thrust investing institutions is the unclear role of organizations 
played in ICT-informed political arenas: To go beyond the fixation on traditional parties and 
public spheres as the only relevant organizational schemes for consent flow aggregation and 
directing, as well as the recent hype about the spontaneous orders emerging from crowed-
sourcing  and  self-organized  political  action  –  a.k.a.  organizing  without  organizations  – 
political theory needs to develop frameworks that can grasp the different levels, goals and 
intensities of organizing collective action: the fundamental nexus between formal institutions 
and the solving of free-riding problems needs rethinking, because information is a critical 
problem for organizations and that would be reason enough to shed new light on how ICTs 
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impact  on  the  myriad  of  organizational  structures  in  contemporary  politics.  Mainstream 
democracy studies have not focused much on the interaction between technologies and the 
organizational  structures.  Yet  “conceptualizing  information  and  communication  as  central 
features of politics that might be fundamental reasons for the existence – or transformation – 
of groups in the first place”
57: How should we understand the difference between a civic 
association  and  an  interest  group  for  instance?  Organizations  do  not  comprehend  merely 
bottom-up, grass-root or civil society organizations but also public top-down organizations: 
How is  the relationship  between e-government  –  such as  it is  being implemented e.g. in 
Europe through eEurope 2005 action plan or the i2010 initiative – and administrative reform 
more generally evolving? What impact does the e-governmental agenda have on the lower 
levels of administration in its search for the proximity to citizens? What kind of bearing, if 
any, does it have on “horizontal” political identification practices and groupings? 
 
3. Transformations to participation and its prerequisites  
In relation to (c3) – political participation and processes of formation of consent and dissent 
through  parties  and  movements  –  we  need  to  rethink  basic  aspects  of  mobilization, 
informational  pluralism,  dynamics  of  public  opinion,  structure  of  the  public  sphere  etc. 
Empirical work on e-participation still disagrees on the benefic vs. malefic impacts of ICTs: 
on  the  one  hand  some  see  participation  increasing  and  deliberation  potentially  improve 
decisions,
58 others warn that it might be dangerous.
59 
As  social  theory  was  discovering  that  being  virtual  is  an  extension  of  time -space 
distanciation, whereby relations between social actors are increasingly disembedded – i.e. one 
of the most conspicuous characteristics of late modernity that gives rise to a range of highly 
significant social reconfigurations – we still ignore how ICTs are impacting the political side 
of  this  virtuality.  In  the  only  entry  dedicated  to  the  digital  age  of  Marc  Bevir’s  recent 
Encyclopedia  of  Political  Theory,  namely  “Virtual”,  Stephen  Coleman  stresses  that  “it  is 
unwise to think of virtuality in a politically deterministic way. That is to say, being virtual 
neither empowers nor weakens citizens; it neither broadens nor constrains public spheres. (…) 
In  some  situations,  it  allows  people  to  engage  in  more  meaningful  communications  that 
strengthen  opportunities  for  consequential  collective  action;  in  other  situations  virtual 
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interaction might be a poor substitute for physical intercourse. It is equally unwise to think of 
the  virtual  as  being  wholly  decoupled  from  the  real  or  physical;  in  most  cases,  acting 
virtually— such as sending an e-mail, taking a photograph, or joining a global movement—
leads to social activities in the real world. Although some virtual experiences (such as online 
gaming) are fairly self-contained, most are not.”
60 
This ambiguity of uses imply that, among the transformative thrusts, we find other – 
perhaps unsuspected – challenges facing representative democracy today, primarily in relation 
to  public  opinion:  are  outsider,  oppositional  or  fringe  organizations  likely  to  benefit 
(disproportionately?) from  the rise of  ICTs, potentially posing a challenge to  mainstream 
politics? How should we understand this phenomenon dubbed the “Zapatista effect”?
61 This 
might not only be due to equalization, i.e. the fact that all bits are equal on the net making 
extremists positions no less available than mainstream opinions, but also to the deliberative 
effect on the web 2.0: «when people talk what happens? Do group members compromise? Do 
they move towards the middle (…)? The answer is now clear and it is not what intuition 
would  suggest:  groups  go  to  extremes.  More  precisely,  members  of  a  deliberating  group 
usually end up in a more extreme position (…). Group polarization is a typical phenomenon 
in deliberating groups».
62 An interesting case study here would perhaps be Finland: Can the 
hyper-connectivity  of  the  country  that  first  constitutionalized  access  to  broad  band  be 
correlated  to  polarization  in  politics,  with  the  recent  national istic  upswing  in  the  last 
elections? 
A part from  polarization, cocooning is another issue, i.e. the fact that people entrench 
into closed circles of political information where citizens can easily filter out news of certain 
kinds, an inclination due foremost to preference for avoiding “cognitive dissonance”: it is not 
per  se  a  new  problem  but  ICTs  enhance  the  effect  by  picking  and  choosing  sources  of 
information more freely in a panorama of more fragmented media where “trust” is bound to 
become  a  central  epistemic  value
63  and  perhaps  also  key  to  understanding  political 
orientation. In a world where more than 50% of the world’s population has access to some 
combination of ICTs (5 billion cell-phone users, around 2 billion internet users, some 6,7% of 
the world’s population having private access to the web) another problem for public opinion 
is the long-term effects of unrestrained gossip on the democratic system that tend to make 
false rumours go viral.
64 
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Another connected worry is the “mediocratisation of knowledge”
65, i.e. the phenomenon 
of mistrust in experts that is often associated with the faith in crowed-sourced wisdom.
66 The 
open source pioneer Eric Raymond, for instance, has raised concerns about Wikipedia being 
“disastrous” from such a standpoint: According to Raymond, open source is not applicable to 
an encyclopaedia, as highlighted by the introduction of Wiki’s 5 robots protecting entries 
against the obscenities and mass deletion of wikitrolls, the semi-closure of certain entries such 
as  God,  Al  Gore,  Galileo  and  Chopin,  notwithstanding  the  “success  story”  that  Nature 
published in 2005 finding a 4:3 error ratio between Wikipedia and the British encyclopaedia. 
Linked to potential changes in the structure and dynamics of public opinion we find the 
changes in the public sphere that ICTs induce and that social and political theory is currently 
tracking: the Internet is often presented as a potential public sphere. Building on John B. 
Thompson’s  theoretical  account  of  mediatisation  as  a  process  whereby  “the  exchange  of 
symbolic forms is no longer restricted primarily to the contexts of face-to-face interaction, but 
is  extensively  and  increasingly  mediated  by  the  institutions  and  mechanisms  of  mass 
communication”,
67 some scholars have argued that social membership is increasingly taking a 
virtual  form,  for  example,  in  online  social  movements  and  communities,  and  enabled 
relationships  between  governments  and  citizens.  This  was  the  ground  for  the  rise  of  the 
“Netizen”  in  the  90ies  as  a  “virtual  citizen”.  It  is  noteworthy  that  unlike  “virtual 
representation” in traditional political theory, which sought to justify the absence of people 
from power by characterizing them as virtually spoken for, Internet-related virtuality tend to 
be  employed  as  a  way  of  enhancing  participation,  by  characterizing  citizens  as  virtually 
spoken with. 
The changes in the public sphere call for better understanding: at the same time public 
opinion appears to be divided (polarized, segmented, fragmented etc.) and empowered. One 
transformative (and understudied) aspect of participation is the increased support from expat 
communities (“virtual overseas party branches”), a direct impact of global diasporas using 
ICTs. Another challenge at this level of analysis (c.3) is to design mobilization procedures 
adapted to inforgs. It is often stressed that online donors tend to be “middle-class, fairly well 
educated and politically active”:
68 How do you design mobilization procedures adapted to 
politically inactive inforgs? In the early 2000’s it was often stressed that online campaigning 
would only attract the least participative age group: How is it when the digital natives grow 
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older? “Across Europe to date [we face a] reinforcement rather than a mobilization story”.
69 
There is considerable scope to analyse how and why online recruitment fails or succeeds. 
 
4. Transformations to citizen education: redesigning net etiquette? 
In relation to (c4) – citizen education – we need to rethink the “skill reset” that ICTs are 
prompting. Citizen education has appeared for some time to be a promise that traditional 
democratic  theory  had  not  kept:
70  While democrats typically believe that the practice of 
democracy modifies the ability of citizens to choose, making them do bet ter choices, reality 
has often been stubborn in showing the opposite. In relation to this level of analysis too, we 
are witnessing a form of transformation: the problem itself is not new but it is assuming new 
forms.  Think  of  the  Citizen’s  Briefing  Book,  cahier  de  doléances  that  the  Obama 
administration created for promoting e-democracy, i.e. a virtual arena where netizens could 
describe their own political proposals and vote for one another’s suggestions. As the initial 
fervour for e-campaigning in the wake of Obama’s election
71 left place for greater scepticism, 
in September 2009, the Citizen’s Briefing Book had over 44 000 proposals and 1,4 million 
votes. However, the most popular proposals were legalizing marijuana and onlinepoker and 
granting free wifi access.
72 Sceptics usually point to the fact that providing electronic tools for 
participation is not the same thing as empowering members to participate: this is an old 
problem; what is changing are the terms of the issue, say, for instance, who sets the e-agenda? 
Is the interface single-issue driving or broad value enhancing? How free or constrained are 
facilitators or technical translators, including administratively non -trained technicians with 
civil  servant-like  functions?  What  role  do  they  play  in  “adjusting”  the  software?  Are 
organizational  headquarters  more  likely  to  dominate  the  e-agenda  and  strengthen  their 
position  or  not?    Are  the  hubs  of  such  participative  networks  political  professionals  or 
laymen? Would that change the overall assessment of the quality of participation?  
Other  citizen  education-related  issues  likely  to  gain  from  being  framed  into  the 
transformative dimension of e-democracy are the following (they are not entirely novel, and 
stocktaking from previous experiences can be valuable to set up guidelines): Whereas there is 
a longstanding tradition concerning journalistic behaviour, there is no established net etiquette 
for people blogging on political matters. It is common in the US that bloggers advocate for a 
campaign in return for a consultant fee: should bloggers reveal financial connections to a 
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campaign? Similar issues concern bloggers’ potentially abusive language and its connection 
to the abovementioned suggestion to decriminalize defamation. Another politically salient 
issue here is the management of “collective memory” on the web. On the individual level, old 
posts create a problem of claiming, enjoying and enforcing a “right to oblivion” but on the 
collective  level  this  implies  a  problem  about  having  a  “right  to  change  one’s  mind”:  a 
politician caught off guard in one moment in time expressing contradicting views to current 
ideas is likely to be targeted: how are ICTs changing such situations? 
Yet  another  problem  that  calls  on  digital  educational  measures  adapted  to  the  new 
situation concerns anonymity and encryption practices. The ICT revolution, it is often said, 
has a megaphone multiplier effect, which need not amplify just what we “like”. Jaron Lanier 
in You are not a Gadget argued that anonymity provided by the Internet can promote a sadist 
culture.
73 On the one hand, we see phenomena of individual “sadism” such as the “human-
flesh search” in China, denounced on the NYT Magazine 2010 by Tom Downey, i.e. a kind of 
crowed-sourced detective work where people find and hunt down enemies in corrupt officials 
or simply people who have made others angry. On the other hand, encryption make mafia’s 
and terrorist networks thrive: “as relatively inexpensive encryption technology continues to 
proliferate on the commercial market, there is little doubt that autocrats and hackers will make 
use of it, too. Finding the balance between protecting dissidents and enabling criminals will 
be  difficult  at  best”.
74  Balancing  accountability  against  anonymization  will  need  civic 
engagement and make education more important on the democratic agenda and redesign our 
ways of viewing “acceptable” anonymity. 
Last but not least, a politically relevant aspect of the digital age and its specific forms of 
interaction is how the repertoire of civil disobedience is changing. The non-violent movement 
has developed alternative strategies to violence even since it first appeared (e.g. boycotts, sit-
ins etc.) but the Internet has made the flourishing of non-violent new forms of opposition gain 
momentum. These include electronic civil disobedience and hacktivism where online activists 
have targeted governments and corporations through the defacing of websites, publishing of 
private  information,  through  swarming  and  denial  of  service  attacks  (DDoS)  that  tie  up 
websites and networks. Besides criticism coming from targets, there is criticism also from the 
very activists: is online activism a shallow form of participation that distracts from real-world 
activities? Does it promote isolated activists? 
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V. Where lies the revolutionary thrust? 
Let us now go back to the cousins of political philosophy so as to better grasp what in the 
current state-of-the-art concerning e-democracy really signals novelty. As the transformative 
dimension pushes for a still on-going process of updating, a further step is being taken in 
many fields of practical relevance. I shall refer to this shift of perspective, or awakening to the 
uniqueness of the technology impacting our world, as the “revolutionary” thrust. The idea is 
that information technology leaves some things as they were, and changes others to such an 
extent  that  previously  received  wisdom  is  of  little  practical  use  in  developing  plausible 
answerers to the upcoming challenges, but ICTs also increasingly entail a list of unheard-of 
problems that we are not culturally and scientifically prepared to address and that therefore 
are, indeed, “revolutionary” in their novelty. So as to stress what distinguishes this category 
of phenomena from those listed under (b2), a quote is useful: Walter Maner wrote, back in 
1996,  that  “for  all  of  these  issues,  there  was  an  essential  involvement  of  computing 
technology. Except for this technology, these issues would not have arisen, or would not have 
arisen in their highly altered form. The failure to find satisfactory non-computer analogies 
testifies to the uniqueness of these issues. (…) Lack of an effective analogy forces us to 
discover new (…) values, formulate new (…) principles, develop new policies, and find new 
ways to think about the issues presented to us.”
75 
So as to illustrate the revolutionary thrust in adjacent fields of study, we can point to the 
rise of information ethics that goes beyond computer ethics in its earlier formulation since the 
fundamental subject of ethics is no longer held to be the human being, but subject to ethics is 
also  informational  entities.  Like  other  realms  of  normative  ethics  abandoned  the 
anthropocentrism of traditional ethics (e.g. Peter Singer and animal rights, Arne Naess and the 
deep  ecology  movement),  in  informative  ethics  anthropocentrism  is  substituted  with 
ontocentrism.
76 Richard Stallman’s four freedoms essential to software development in the 
GNU Manifesto (freedom to run a program for any purpose, freedom to study the mechanics 
of the program and modify it, freedom to redistribute copies, and freedom to improve and 
change modified versions for public use) could be read within such a development of ethics. 
The rights are not seldom presented as those of the software, not of traditional agents. This 
leaves room for plenty of debates but it clearly changes our moral toolkit drastically. 
In economics, the “revolutionary” aspect of ICTs appeared in relation to the long tail, i.e. 
the retailing strategy of selling a large number of rarely required items in relatively small 
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quantities  –  usually  in  addition  to  selling  fewer  popular  items  in  large  quantities.  To 
Anderson, examples of such long tails include Amazon and Netflix.
77 We could add iTunes 
etc. Because of the negligible stocking, inventory and distribution costs of digital copies, such 
business models realize significant profit out of selling small volumes of hard-to-find items to 
many customers instead of only selling large volumes of a reduced number of popular items. 
Given enough choice, customers change their selection and buying patterns so as to result in 
the  demand  across  products  having  a  power  law  distribution  or  Pareto  distribution.  One 
innovatory  consequence  is  the  radically  different  capitalization  processes.
78  Moreover, 
economics discovered the “revolutionary” implications of ICTs with the emergence of de-
centralized non-market based transitional framework that compete with traditional forms of 
exchange; e.g. new forms of competition include the P2P collaboration groups that produce 
open-source software or create wikis, but also the crowdsourcing model, in which a company 
outsources work to a large group of market players using a collaborative online platform, and 
more  generally  work  performed  by  individuals  in  commons-like  networks  that  enable  a 
“system of production, distribution, and consumption of information goods characterized by 
decentralized individual action carried out through widely distributed, nonmarket means that 
do not depend on market strategies”.
79 This economic dimension, it should not be forgotten, is 
strictly linked to the emergence of the web 2.0 that is today at the center of the discussions on 
e-democracy.
80 
Yet, the analysis of the specifically political dimension of the impact of this technology 
is still largely unexplored, which might seem all the more surprising since the Internet has a 
structure that per se promotes informative pluralism since it enjoys a “variable geometry” (to 
use  a  fashionable  expression  in  EU  studies):  contrarily  to  one-to-many  or  point-to-point 
media  as  traditional  broadcast  and  publishing,  the  Internet  enables  many-to-many 
communication  (e.g.  FB),  one-to-one  communication  (e.g.  e-agenda),  many-to-one  (e.g. 
mail). It also has an interactive capability unlike traditional “passivity-promoting” media. Add 
to this the lowering of entry costs into the discussion that stimulated the rise of UGC (User 
generated content). Finally, it is a decentralized or a-cephalous media, contrarily to traditional 
media: conceived an as anarchical space, there is no hierarchy among flows – every bit has 
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the same “value” on the net. This is an aspect that is often referred to being intrinsically 
“democratic”, even thought “egalitarian” is perhaps a better label. 
These characteristics  are raising some unprecedented problematic dimensions.  Here  I 
shall list, on the one hand, some unique general challenges and, on the other hand, some 
novelties specifically related to democratic ways of governing, foremost parliamentary rule. 
 
1. General challenges  
Among the unprecedented general challenges that the Internet is raising we find the threats of 
cyber-terrorism  (e.g.  Russia’s  attack  on  Estonia  in  2007)  that  seems  to  draw  the  broad 
brushstrokes  of  a  new  setting  for  International  relations,
81  as well as the digital divide 
separating the information haves and have-nots:
82 the total bandwidth of the Internet in Africa 
is equal to that of the Brazilian city of Sao Paulo, and the total bandwidth of the Inter net in 
Latin America is equal to that of Seoul, Korea. It is not only a matter of income, but it is 
multidimensional problem, involving availability of technology and physical infrastructure, as 
well  as  digital  literacy.  This  means  the  divide  cuts  new boun daries  within  and  across 
communities and cannot be subsumed into, or presupposed to be overlapping with, already 
existing categories of cognitive marginalization and subaltern groupings (it might replicate 
some, but it also develops others). 
Another unprecedented challenge concerns the issue of recognizing and protecting  what 
Hillary Clinton calls “the freedom to connect”. Finland was the first country in the world to 
constitutionalize access to broadband. How should such a right be understood against the 
backdrop of modern constitutionalism? The right to connect should also be viewed in relation 
to the battle over Net neutrality. Such a right is linked to the digital divide as an instance of 
fighting informational inequality that we know has negative feedbacks on empowerment. In 
the  background,  we  find  the  broader  cultural  struggle  against  the  commodification  of 
information  and  its  increased  propertization  with  its  negative  impact  on  creativity  and 
innovation.
83 How is such a right to access to be understood  on the ground of conventional 
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theories of rights? Is it part of a new cascade of collective claims that amount to a “new wave 
of rights” or can it be subsumed under previously recognized types of rights, such as the right 
of freedom of expression and the right to share information as they appear in the 1948 UN 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  (art  19,  art  27  §1)?  Is  the  right  to  connect  mirrored  in  an 
obligation to provide connectivity? Conferred to whom? Can it be coherently framed into 
traditional negative liberties? Part of the freedom to connect is clearly of negative quality – 
prohibiting the state and the market from hindering or creating illegitimate impediments to 
access –, yet it is also associated with major investment in infrastructural development that 
traditionally are linked to positive liberties. Is it therefore a right structurally more similar to 
the  right  to  education  than  to  free  speech?  Should  it  be  compared  to  a  right  that  grants 
freedom from intromission in communication or to the right to information? Just like other 
traditional rights of Man, strategies have to be developed to protect it against contrasting 
forces. How can such strategies best be adjusted to the type of right we are concerned with? 
If we look at some of the challenges that Internet is facing today, we see that it is under 
siege by both the state and the market. While in relation to the state, it can be claimed that 
both  direct  intervention  (such  as  arresting  hacktivists  and  jailing  bloggers)  and  indirect 
intervention (censure of contents, e.g. China blocking websites containing key terms such as 
“democracy”  and  “human  rights”  as  denounced  by  Reporters  without  borders,  or  states 
shutting down the Internet, e.g. Iran 2009, Egypt 2010) are reminiscent of traditional forms; 
yet what is unprecedented is that mechanisms used to censor information on the Internet are 
increasingly sophisticated, with multi-layered controls that are often hidden from the public. 
In  relation  to  the  market,  some  threats  to  the  Internet  might  seem  reminiscent  of  “old” 
problems such as for instance oligopolistic concentrations of ISPs (e.g. dominant positions of 
some players like Google, Microsoft,  Apple,  Facebook),  yet others are new: The type of 
problem  that  are  raised  by  the  last  mile  or  Net  neutrality.  Some  companies  that  are 
guaranteeing the access to the Internet (often telecom-companies) are thinking of realizing a 
Net of fast-tracks, short-cuts etc. so as to maximize profits. Should this be allowed? Under 
what circumstances? How would an alternatively designed architecture alter the access to the 
right to connect? 
 
2. Specific challenges to parliamentary rule 
Among the more specific challenges to democratic stiles of government, foremost in relation 
to  parliamentary  rule,  ICTs  are  currently  creating  new  ways  for  (d1)  the  transfer  of 
information  between  different  actors  in  the  political  arena  and  this  makes  (d2)  citizens,  
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political  parties  and  civil  society  organizations  acquire  possibilities  of  more  intense 
interaction; a perspective that can lead to (d.3) new ways of participating in the democratic 
process,  such  as  (d.3.1.) through  e-voting forms or (d.3.2.) innovative  ways  of analyzing 
public opinion.  
For  the  information  transfer  between  different  institutionally  codified  actors  in  the 
political arena a viable option, differences in national systems have to be overcome. This is 
the goal of the promotion of parliamentary standardization: the Global Centre for ICT in 
Parliament organizes a conference (World e-Parliament Conference) designed as a forum for 
the sharing of best practices and laying down future guidelines. This standardization effort 
continues with e-Parliament Framework 2010 – 2020. Much work on standardization is being 
done  through  systems  such  as  MetaLex  that  focuses  on  sharing  documents  in  Extensible 
Markup Language (XML format), creating common metadata, facilitate citations and cross-
references  between  different  documents  of  different  parliamentary  systems,  or  on  the 
determination of abstract classes of models that can serve as to identify similar structures 
despite varying appellatives (an article is logically invariable even though it might be called 
something else in some legal systems). Such an example is the Akoma Ntoso project. The 
standardization enables sharing of information between parliaments in a innovative way and 
to  an  unprecedented  extent  that  is  susceptible  of  laying  the  basis  for  greater  bi-  and 
multilateral  parliamentary  cooperation  –  quite  surely  a  prerequisite  for  high-quality  law-
making  in  a  world  of  increasing  cross-border  consequences  and  formerly  reserved  for 
operations within the executive branch. Of course, as in all phenomena of convergence, a risk 
of exaggerated streamlining and loss of pluralism might be present. The rapid growth of ICTs 
has  changed  the  environment  within  which  parliaments  operate.  Rather  than  being  mere 
witnesses  to  these  changes,  they  can  choose  to  strengthen  the  legislative  processes  and 
participatory political engagement.  
In the current phase, E-parliamentarization is essentially characterized by the digitization 
and sharing of documents, the focus is still on the individual act. However, the move that is 
occurring is a shift of focus from the output of legislation (i.e. acts) to promoting visibility 
and accessibility of the entire legislative process. The use of information technology opens up 
new prospects for cooperation, participation and sharing information and knowledge which 
makes  it  necessary  to  shift  attention  from  the  single  final  output  (the  law)  to  a  more 
comprehensive approach to law-making, taking into consideration previously unavailable or 
marginalized information in the process such as amendments, reports, draft laws, the role of  
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committees, legislative inquiries etc.). In other words, the new forms might stress previously 
hidden dissent.  
This approach aims to improve the quality of legal drafting, making these documents 
clearer,  less  ambiguous  etc.  where  the  presupposition  is  that  more  eyes  with  contrasting 
interests and preferences examining a text will increase the probability of singling out and 
pinpointing  potential  loopholes  and  equivocality.  The  type  of  drafting  is  also  changing: 
drafting can now be done in layers. A single piece of legislation thus appears as a normative 
chain of text versions: texts that modify existing documents, and those that are being modified 
by it, can be mapped and followed through time (versioning); the logical structure of norms is 
being captured through languages such as RuleML, and documents are being indexed based 
on  conceptual  analysis  (ontologies)  of  its  legal  domains,  and  meta-information  has  been 
incorporated in documents, including constitutional court decisions or ECJ rulings etc. It is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  such  changes  will  impact  on  the  type,  quality,  and  systematic 
character of interpretative practices. A challenge here is to assess the rule of law-promoting 
capacity such procedures may entail. 
In the legislation process, citizens rarely have access to the content of legislation until it 
is in its final stages and can only know about the haggling and negotiating of representatives 
through  the  reporting  of  journalists  –  this  is  perhaps  about  to  change.  The  E-parliament 
approach that is  currently being implemented in many countries also intends to highlight 
discussions that were not previously available to citizen scrutiny. This does not merely imply 
increased availability of information but more radically it also shifts emphasis onto previously 
concealed dissent. In practice this means that accessible documents will not include only the 
final legislative output as published by official sources, but also other kinds of documentation 
that is relevant for the formation of the law, yet that has been traditionally kept at the margins 
of the process with the effect of occulting dissent: think of mark-ups in drafting processes, 
amendment tracking, parliamentary reports, travaux préparatoires etc. An example of how 
the digitalization of parliamentary workings is changing practical politics is the role of the 
motion to amend: often used in parliamentary proceedings to water down a motion into a 
form that is more likely to be accepted or to convert it into a form that is more likely to be 
rejected, it can now be used to block the legislative process: the European Parliament enabled 
its  members  to  submit  amendments  to  bills  directly  on  the  web:  the  amendments  are 
sometimes so many that a blockage of the entire legislative process occurs. Whether for the 
good or for the bad, it is beyond doubt that ICTs are modifying some parts of the internal 
workings of representative democracy.  
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Traditionally, citizens hardly ever look directly at the content of legislation, more often 
relying on the recycled analysis of pundits who very likely did not read the legislation either. 
This  is  another  aspect  that  is  liable  to  change.  E-parliament  tools  also  provide  for  the 
appearance  of  prosumers  in  the  political  information  field:  TheyWorkForYou  for  instance 
enable prosumers to mash parliamentary data from the official British Hansard to remixed it 
in such a way that lay audiences can profitably follow the course of an issue: it allows users to 
track a particular issue or MP, comment on parliamentary proceedings, register for updates on 
specific issues etc. An example of such an institutionally designed application is the citizen’s 
mail making it possible to send email the European parliament. An example of civil society 
generated devise is Issue Crawler that searches the web to establish where issues are being 
discussed and how those discussions are linked, making it easier to map the communicative 
landscape  and  sense  how  a  debate  is  developing.  Another  interesting  case  is  the  project 
founded  by  Lessig  and  Trippi  in  2008  called  Change  Congress  that  aims  to  augment 
accountability in limiting “corruption“ (i.e. distorted influence of money) in the US Congress. 
The innovative aspect of such possibilities lies in the fact that “the theoretical debate 
between  direct,  inclusive  democracy  and  indirect,  constitutionally  balanced  representation 
(…) totally ignores the possibility of options in between (…). The public has generally been 
spoken at, rather than with (….). Digital ICTs could play a vital role in changing the terms of 
that relationship.”
84 
Another revolutionary impact of ICTs on parliamentarism is the possibility that is now 
opening up to devise workable inter-parliamentary dialogue, a possibility that until yesterday 
remained  highly  impracticable.  The  cooperation  between  parliaments  arises  from  the 
possibility  of  sharing  knowledge  and  information.  It  is  currently  being  promoted  by  the 
Global  Centre  for  ICT  in  Parliament,  a  joint  initiative  of  the  United  Nations,  the  Inter-
Parliamentary Union and a group of national and regional parliaments (European Parliament, 
the  Pan  African  Parliament,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  of  the  Italian  Parliament,  national 
Assembly of Hungary, the People's Assembly of Egypt, National Assembly of South Africa) 
that was launched in November 2005 during the world Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS). A potential impact could be the possibility, acknowledged in the Lisbon Treaty, of 
half  of  Europe’s  national  parliaments  working  together  to  block  a  proposal  of  the 
Commission.  Such  possibilities  might  reinvigorate  the  tension  between  governments  and 
parliaments around Europe. Similarly the Ipex seeks to expand the information base available 
to national parliaments with regard to specific EU documents. 
                                                           
84 Stephen Coleman, Making Parliamentary Democracy Visible. In: Anstead & Chadwick (note 11) at 96.  
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Add to this the deliberative, participative and direct democratic practices that use ICTs, 
such  as  online  discussions,  online  polls,  e-petitions,  e-consultations  on  issues  and  e-
consultations  on  bills.  ICTs  seem  to  have  an  impact  foremost  on  “direct  democracy 
institutions”  (e.g.  citizen  initiatives,  referendum…),  and  especially  on  forms  of  candidate 
recruitment  (e.g.  primaries):  “In  the  United  States  most  of  the  internet  campaigning 
innovations (…) have occurred during primaries.”
85 In particular, we should stress that the 
most challenging forms of ICTs in politics are those that intend to apply crowdsourcing and 
wikis for legislative purposes, to attempt to circumvent strong interest groups or corporations. 
Recently, Brazil suggested a rather sophisticated “Wikislation” website, e-democracia, as a 
method of creating web content that could be applied to the legislative process. The idea is to 
create  more  direct  participation  by  citizens  and  more  transparency  in  the  work  done  by 
legislators, by  relying on the  "wisdom of the crowd". Such forms of  wikilation are very 
different from institutions such as the referendum that can hardly be considered “participation 
in policy making” since it leaves the citizenry with only a veto possibility through a Yes/No 
vote on a pre-established draft. It remains to see what results such ICT-enhanced procedures 
can yield in legislation. Yet what is sure is that they open an array of other issues, that go 
beyond the problems we have already highlighted: what is the role of the technical translators 
in the drafting process? Can such wikilations-architectures be structured though distributed 
participatory design or is top-down systematization necessary? Are such changes promoting 
legislation  of  higher  quality?  Should  we  conceive  such  co-legislation  as  alternative  or 
composite to ordinary legislative measures? Can such mechanisms pose challenges also for 
the realms of decrees? Can such measures promote infra-party democratization? How do we 
design  and  enforce  the  access  to  participation  by  those  belonging  to  a  determinate 
constituency? How should such constituencies be determined?  
 
VI. Conclusions 
Technologies embed choices that are politically salient, yet mainstream political theory has 
taken the issue rather lightly. Compared to what has been going on over the past few decades 
in the other branches of practical thought, namely ethics, economics and the law, political 
theory  lags  behind  in  understanding  the  current  technological  revolution  and  its  impact, 
potentialities  and  risks.  Yet  the  current  emphasis  on  Internet  politics  that  polarizes  the 
apologists that hold the web to overcome the one-to-many architecture of opinion-building in 
traditional  representative  democracy,  and  the  critics  that  warn  cyber-optimism  entails 
                                                           
85 See Anstead & Chadwick (note 11) at 65.   
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authoritarian technocracy has acted as a wakeup call. This paper has taken a first step in 
outlining a comprehensive research agenda on the problem “what is it about ICTs, as opposed 
to  previous  technical  devices,  that  impact  on  politics  and  determine  uncertainty  about 
democratic matters?”. A non-exhaustive but hopefully indicative conceptual map of (clusters 
of micro-)problems and concrete examples relating to e-democracy, has been presented. The 
point is to highlight when and why the hyphen of e-democracy has a conjunctive as opposed 
to a disjunctive function. There is considerable scope to analyse how and why online politics 
fails or succeeds, and how and why it deserves the label “democratic”. 
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